8.2 Architecture and
Landscaping
Landscaping design elements that are attractive and
Interior Design
welcoming can enhance security. For example, plants can
deter unwanted entry; ponds and fountains can block
vehicle access; and site grading can also limit access. Avoid
IMPORTANT NOTE: The following criteria do NOT apply to all
landscaping that permits concealment of criminals or
projects. Follow each criterion only if instructed to by your
obstructs the view of security personnel and CCTV, in
project-specific risk assessment. Many criteria are based on
accordance with accepted CPTED principles.
the recommendations of a specific building risk assessment/
threat analysis. Where the criteria include a blank or offer a
choice of approaches, the recommendations from risk
assessment will provide information for filling in the blank or
suggesting a choice of approaches.
Planning
Office Locations. Offices of vulnerable officials should be
placed or glazed so that the occupant cannot be seen from
an uncontrolled public area such as a street. Whenever
possible, these offices should face courtyards, internal
sites, or controlled areas. If this is not possible, suitable
obscuring glazing or window treatment shall be provided,
including blast and ballistic resistant glass (see section on
New Construction, Exterior Windows, Additional Glazing
Requirements), blast curtains, or other interior protection
systems.
Mixed Occupancies. When possible, high-risk tenants
should not be housed with low-risk tenants. If they are
housed together, publicly accessible areas should be
separated from high-risk tenants.
Public Toilets and Service Areas. Public toilets, service
spaces, or access to vertical circulation systems should not
be located in any non-secure areas, including the queuing
area before screening at the public entrance.
Lobbies. See the GS0A PBS document, Design Notebook
for Federal Lobby Security.
Oakland Federal Building
239
SECURITY
DESIGN
8.2
Architecture and Interior Design
Revised March 2005 PBS-P100
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